The Rhetorical Canons of Construction: New Textualism\u27s Rhetoric Problem by Stewart, Charlie D.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 116 Issue 8 
2018 
The Rhetorical Canons of Construction: New Textualism's 
Rhetoric Problem 
Charlie D. Stewart 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charlie D. Stewart, The Rhetorical Canons of Construction: New Textualism's Rhetoric Problem, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 1485 (2018). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol116/iss8/6 
 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
COMMENT
The Rhetorical Canons of Construction:
New Textualism’s Rhetoric Problem
Charlie D. Stewart*
New Textualism is ascendant. Elevated to prominence by the late Justice
Antonin Scalia and championed by others like Justice Neil Gorsuch, the
method of interpretation occupies an increasingly dominant place in Ameri-
can jurisprudence. Yet, this Comment argues the proponents of New Textual-
ism acted unfairly to reach this lofty perch. To reach this conclusion, this
Comment develops and applies a framework to evaluate the rhetoric behind
New Textualism: the rhetorical canons of construction. Through the rhetorical
canons, this Comment demonstrates that proponents of New Textualism ad-
vance specious arguments, declare other methods illegitimate hypocritically,
refuse to engage with the merits of their opponents’ arguments, and believe
their method provides the best plain meaning.
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Introduction
For as long as legal texts have existed, there has been a battle over how to
interpret them. Spanning from early Blackstonian textualism, to intentional-
ism, to Hart and Sacks purposivism, the debate is spirited and has been well
fought for centuries. Over the last few decades, however, the debate has
largely quieted with the rise and dominance of the New Textualist school of
interpretation. Although an oversimplification—since New Textualism has
nuances—the doctrine “in its purest form[ ] begins and ends with what the
text says and fairly implies.”1
This rise of New Textualism, championed by the late Justice Antonin
Scalia and by Justice Neil Gorsuch,2 is a story of rhetoric as much as one of
interpretive technique. Justice Scalia, in particular, led the charge to delegi-
timize the use of all other methods of statutory interpretation as unprinci-
pled and akin to “looking over the faces of the crowd at a large cocktail party
and picking out your friends.”3 Indeed, it seems Justice Scalia made it his
life’s work to supplant traditional methods of interpretation with New Tex-
tualism.4 By focusing on the text, he claimed, judges would be more con-
strained, principled, and consistent.5
But like any other mode of statutory interpretation, New Textualism has
advantages and disadvantages. There is significant and growing evidence
that New Textualist methods do not impose a greater constraint on judges
than do any other methods of interpretation.6 Nevertheless, a focus on the
text is legitimate when interpreting statutes. This Comment contends that
the corresponding rhetoric behind New Textualism is what poses a problem.
Prominent voices in the New Textualist movement often shut down the de-
bate by advancing their own specious arguments while calling other meth-
ods illegitimate or unprincipled. Although claiming the superiority of one’s
1. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 16 (2012).
2. While eulogizing Justice Scalia, Justice Gorsuch said, “much has changed [in the last
three decades], giving way to a return to a much more traditional view of the judicial function,
one in which judges seek to interpret texts as reasonable affected parties might have done
rather than rewrite texts to suit their own policy preferences.” Neil M. Gorsuch, Lecture, Of
Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
905, 906 (2016). Justice Gorsuch would go on to extol the virtues of a New Textualist mindset.
See id. at 905–15.
3. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dies at 79, Wash. Post (Feb. 13,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-
at-79/2016/02/13/effe8184-a62f-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html?utm_term=.a7d88d8e5dd
6 [https://perma.cc/F977-P7M4] (paraphrasing a quote widely attributed to Justice Scalia).
4. A regime the late justice referred to as, “The Prevailing Confusion.” Scalia & Gar-
ner, supra note 1, at 9.
5. See generally id.
6. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113
Colum. L. Rev. 531, 532–37 (2013) (reviewing Scalia & Garner, supra note 1).
June 2018] The Rhetorical Canons of Construction 1487
own method of interpretation is part of any debate, New Textualists fre-
quently go too far. These advocates attempt to completely delegitimize other
methods of interpretation, allowing them to game the system in their favor.
Unfortunately, no lionizing force like the late Justice Scalia is advocating
for the use of intentionalist or purposivist methods of interpretation. In-
deed, it appears even nontextualists have ceded ground to the New Textual-
ists.7 This is likely because no sane jurist would ever call focusing on the text
illegitimate, since the text is where the controversy originally arises. This
allows New Textualists to advance their method of interpretation along a
united front against a largely faceless and disorganized enemy.8
This Comment does not advance the proposition that the text of a stat-
ute or document should be disregarded or even discounted in the interpre-
tive process. On the contrary, the text is an excellent place to start and
oftentimes an integral component of the interpretive puzzle. This Comment
instead focuses on the rhetoric used by the advocates of New Textualism.
Further, this Comment does not endorse any particular view of statutory
interpretation beyond the proposition that all generally accepted methods
should be on the table and that all sources of information should be at least
considered unless empirically shown to be unreliable or untrue.9
For the time being, the New Textualists appear to have won the interpre-
tive war. The use of the canons of construction10 over the past twenty-five
years has increased significantly, both at the Supreme Court and elsewhere.11
7. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (plurality opinion) (in which
traditionally nontextualist Justices Ginsburg and Kagan wrote the plurality and dissenting
opinions, respectively, each of which applies textual arguments in interpreting the term “tangi-
ble object”); see also infra note 51 and accompanying text.
8. See Elliott M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 983, 1004 (2007) (“[N]ewer textualism does not yet have a
significant opposition.”); see also David K. Ismay & M. Anthony Brown, The Not So New
Textualism: A Critique of John Manning’s Second Generation Textualism, 31 J.L. & Pol. 187, 189
(2015) (“Despite [John F.] Manning’s status as the leading academic proponent of textualism
and the substantial body of scholarly work on textualism he has published, few have attempted
a thorough critique of his theory of textualism. A comprehensive assessment of Manning’s
work is overdue.”(footnote omitted)).
9. See infra Section II.A. For example, courts often utilize a canon against surplusage,
which tells courts to provide each word in a statute with an independent meaning, even if the
words appear identical on their face. See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. But empiri-
cal evidence shows that legislatures often include additional terms (or surplusage) intention-
ally, in a belt-and-suspenders approach. See infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
10. The canons of construction are a series of judicially made semantic and substantive
tools that are utilized by judges when interpreting a statute. The number of canons is unclear
but may be in the hundreds.
11. Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcom-
ing 2018) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3117143
[https://perma.cc/C2LJ-MXPU] (citing Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and
the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What
They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 177, 191 (2017) (“There is now virtually
unanimous agreement among federal judges that text always comes first.”)).
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Some states have even codified the canons.12 But this Comment argues that
the rhetoric surrounding New Textualism made it an unfair fight. Although
the New Textualists may have won, their tactics were damaging to the inter-
pretive debate. Their victory may prove to be pyrrhic in the long run.
Part I explores the history of statutory interpretation and the rise of
New Textualism. Part II develops a framework for critiquing the rhetoric
behind New Textualism, applies it to examples by its leading proponents,
and concludes that New Textualists’ rhetoric damages the debate around
statutory interpretation.
I. How We Got into This Mess
The history of statutory interpretation is a story of confusion. But the
problem of how to interpret ambiguous text is more acute today due to the
profusion of laws that accompanied the rise of the administrative state.13
Instead of uncovering meaning from “natural” sources14 or relying primarily
on the common law, judges today regularly encounter regulations and stat-
utes. The battle of statutory interpretation is no longer a niche area of law.
Rather, it touches nearly every area of the legal world and has profound
implications for the interpretation and enforcement of laws.15 How that bat-
tle is fought, then, is of paramount importance.
This Part traces the history of American statutory interpretation. It be-
gins with modern statutory interpretation’s prehistory in England and then
winds its way through the various epochs of American interpretation. It
culminates with an overview of New Textualism’s ascendance.
Sir William Blackstone may have detailed one of the first statutory inter-
pretation regimes in the seminal Commentaries on the Laws of England.16 In
Blackstone’s view:
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator,
is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs
the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the
12. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodologi-
cal Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1787, 1792 n.152 (2010).
13. See generally Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41
J. Econ. Literature 401 (2003) (discussing the growth of government regulation and the
subversion of regulation by private parties).
14. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 11 (1842) (“[N]or have the Courts power to
create or adopt laws—they must administer the law as existing.”); see also United States v. La
Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551)
(holding that the slave trade violates the law of nations and the law of nature because “[i]t is
repugnant to the great principles of Christian duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obliga-
tions of good faith and morality, and the eternal maxims of social justice”).
15. This ranges from ordinary criminal statutes to regulatory regimes as complicated and
important as the Affordable Care Act.
16. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *59.
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context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and
reason of the law.17
In many ways, Blackstone described the “natural law” theory of interpreta-
tion that dominated Anglo-American legal thinking for much of the seven-
teenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.18 Natural law proponents
believed that the inherent limitations of language made text alone an incom-
plete source of information.19 Many great early American thinkers referenced
the “reason and spirit” of the law they were interpreting as guiding (and
limiting) tools.20 This method of interpretation vests a heavy amount of dis-
cretion in the judge. A natural law approach allows a judge to deviate from
the intent of the legislature if it does not produce a “just” result.21
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the natural law approach
gave way to the formalistic “Old Textualism.”22 Old Textualism was an ances-
tor of New Textualism that took a literal view of statutes and text. Old Textu-
alists followed a positivist approach to law, meaning that judges acted as
pseudolegal scientists who “discovered” rather than created law.23 At their
core, Old Textualists focused on the text of a statute as the clearest expres-
sion of the intent of the legislature. To determine this legislative intent, Old
Textualists believed judges should utilize deductive reasoning to solve any
ambiguity.24 But the rigidity of this early formalism led to resistance by ju-
rists such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the early twentieth century.25
Justice Holmes believed that the competing policy interests could not be
decided neutrally using deductive reasoning or mathematical formulas.26
Proponents of the Holmesian approach adopted the “faithful agents” model
17. Id.; see also Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing the Plain Language Rule of Statutory
Construction: How and Why, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 229, 232 (2004).
18. R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and
Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. 37, 41–48 (1997).
19. See id. at 42.
20. See id. at 42–43. For example, Justice Story believed that “the reason and spirit of the
law, or the causes, which led to its enactment, are often the best exponents of the words, and
limit their application.” Id. at 43 (quoting 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Consti-
tution of the United States §400 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833)).
21. Id. at 45.
22. There are technically three versions of formalism: “the Literal Rule, the Golden Rule,
and the Plain Meaning Rule.” Id. at 49. The Literal Rule requires a court to follow a literal
meaning, even if it’s absurd. Id. The Golden Rule allows courts to depart from the literal
meaning if it creates ambiguity or produces absurd results. Id. at 50. The Plain Meaning Rule is
not as defined but generally allows for purpose to be considered if it’s on the face of the
statute. Id. Yet all three preclude the use of legislative history. Id. at 48–53. For simplicity, these
will collectively be referred to as “Old Textualism.” New Textualism is a modern version of the
Golden Rule version of formalism.
23. Id. at 48.
24. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to Henry M. Hart, Jr. &
Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application
of Law, at lvi (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
25. Id. at lv–lvi.
26. Id.
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of interpretation, which attempts to effectuate the purpose and intent of the
legislature.27 Instead of mechanically looking at the text, the users of the
Holmesian method allowed (and frequently used) legislative history.28 But as
legal realism continued to take root in American jurisprudence, a different
approach took root in statutory interpretation. The New Deal Era, World
War II, and increased focus on public law led to the rise of the purposivists.29
Perhaps best demonstrated by Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks,
purposivists desire to interpret a statute in a way that advances the overall
social goal of the original legislation.30 At bottom, Hart and Sacks
purposivists desired a system of flexible standards when presented with an
ambiguous statute.31 A judge should reason how a given interpretation will
impact (either advance or inhibit) social policy.32 While this approach domi-
nated the 1950s and 1960s,33 a backlash at perceived judicial activism34 led to
the creation of a new approach to statutory interpretation.35
New Textualism has risen to dominance over the past few decades as a
consequence of the backlash against judicial activism.36 Led most promi-
nently by Justice Scalia, the approach advanced a formalist-style mindset
that focuses on text at the expense of resorting to a broader purpose or
looking to legislative history.37 This is not meant to imply that New Textual-
ists are hyperliteralists. Many go to great lengths to reject that label.38 Rather,
27. See Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1883, 1889–900
(2008).
28. Kelso, supra note 18, at 55.
29. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 24, at lxviii–xci; Kelso, supra note 18, at 57.
30. Kelso, supra note 18, at 57.
31. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 24, at xciii (discussing the idea that unless the legisla-
ture provides specific rules, judges should fill in the gaps).
32. See Kelso, supra note 18, at 57–58. An excellent example of this method of interpreta-
tion is United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. There, Justice Brennan overrode clear text and
some legislative history (while utilizing other evidence from the legislative history) to interpret
Title VII in a way that was most consistent (allowing affirmative action plans) with its statu-
tory purpose of fighting discrimination. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
33. Kelso, supra note 18, at 37–38.
34. This Comment focuses on statutory construction, not constitutional interpretation
or construction. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), while associated with judicial activ-
ism, is normally associated with constitutional law. Techniques of statutory interpretation are
not typically associated with constitutional law. Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitu-
tional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 40–46 (2004).
35. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 622–24
(1990).
36. See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 347–48 (2005).
37. Kelso, supra, note 18, at 39.
38. See, e.g., Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 16, 20; Nelson, supra note 36, at 347–48.
Justice Scalia explicitly rejected the label of literalist, stating that his version of textualism
considered context, assuming it worked within the framework of the statute. Scalia & Gar-
ner, supra note 1, at 20.
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New Textualists attempt to discern legislative intent through the lens of an
“objective reader” and a focus on the text and any relevant context.39
New Textualism, on its face, is an appealing method of interpretation. It
looks for meaning in the source of the controversy—the text.40 The ap-
proach provides a set of entertaining interpretive tools that allows the user to
glean meaning from seemingly ambiguous text.41 And, unlike Old Textual-
ism, New Textualism recognizes the importance of context when interpret-
ing a statute—but within carefully proscribed limitations that inhibit
judicial activism.42 It seems to strike a happy medium between the formalis-
tic Old Textualism and the more “unrestrained” approaches to statutory in-
terpretation.43 At bottom, the approach reasonably seeks to “[a]dher[e] to
the fair meaning of the text.”44
New Textualism also appears to impose discipline on the judiciary.45
While legislative history and purpose are “spongy”46 concepts, a focus on the
text restrains judges from injecting their own values into the interpretation
of the statute, or so the argument goes.47 Justice Scalia believed that “the
more the interpretive process strays outside a law’s text, the greater the inter-
preter’s discretion. Extra materials are bound to look in multiple direc-
tions.”48 A judge operating within the text is much less prone to “judicial
adventurism.”49 Using sources outside of the text was akin to “entering a
crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s
friends.”50 Finally, on a fundamental and intuitive level, New Textualism just
seems to make sense—especially to new law students. These qualities al-
lowed it to occupy an increasingly dominant place among the judiciary, to
39. See generally Scalia & Garner, supra note 1.
40. See generally id.
41. See generally id. Similarly, Professor Eskridge explained that “[t]extual canons posit
that Congress follows certain rules of grammar, language use, and punctuation when it writes
statutes.” Eskridge, supra note 35, at 664 .
42. Justice Scalia lists four limitations on the use of purpose and context when interpret-
ing a statute: (1) “the purpose must be derived from the text”; (2) “the purpose must be
defined precisely”; (3) “the purpose is to be described as concretely as possible, not abstractly”;
and (4) “except in the rare cases of an obvious scrivener’s error, purpose . . . cannot be used to
contradict text or to supplement it.” Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 56–57.
43. See Eskridge, supra note 35, at 655–56; see also Scalia & Garner, supra note 1.
44. Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 356.
45. Eskridge, supra note 35, at 654.
46. See id. at 653.
47. Id. at 654.
48. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at xxii.
49. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 377.
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the point where Justice Elena Kagan stated, “we’re all textualists now.”51 But
the meteoric rise of New Textualism has a dark side.52
II. The Rhetorical Canons of Construction and New Textualism
This Part proposes a framework to analyze the rhetoric behind New
Textualism. The framework seeks to identify damaging characteristics of
New Textualist rhetoric through a series of three core “rhetorical canons of
construction.”53 Through these core canons, the framework identifies some
of the underhanded, specious, and unfair rhetorical tactics utilized by New
Textualists and demonstrates how their rhetoric contributed heavily to their
rise to power. Each “rhetorical canon” is described and then applied to ex-
amples of prominent New Textualist opinions and writings. To be clear, the
“rhetorical canons of construction” created by this Comment are different
from the set of semantic and substantive canons designed to interpret stat-
utes and legal texts. Section II.A describes and applies the “hypocrisy ca-
non.” Next, Section II.B describes and applies the “ad hominem canon.”
Finally, Section II.C describes and applies “cocktail party canon.”
A. The “Hypocrisy Canon”
New Textualists often advance specious arguments while calling others
illegitimate. In other words, New Textualists attack a purposivist or inten-
tionalist for a deficiency while advancing an argument about their own ap-
proach that suffers from the same, or a similar, deficiency—making them
hypocritical. This is the hypocrisy canon. When New Textualists deploy the
hypocrisy canon, they refuse to engage with purposivists and intentionalists,
making productive debate difficult, if not impossible. To enter the conversa-
tion, purposivists and intentionalists must show ambiguity within the text
before turning to other sources of information.54 New Textualists are playing
on their home field.
This is distinguishable from the regular legal debate surrounding statu-
tory interpretation. Instead of arguing that the other side is wrong, New
51. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118 (2016)
(reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)) (quoting Justice Elena Kagan,
Lecture at Harvard Law School Antonin Scalia Lecture (Nov. 17, 2015), http://to-
day.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation [https://perma
.cc/9BN6-PMJW] (“I think we’re all textualists now in a way that just . . . was not remotely
true when Justice Scalia joined the bench.”)).
52. Not THE Dark Side of the Force but a dark side. See Star Wars: Episode V—The
Empire Strikes Back (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1980) (“[B]eware of the dark side. Anger . . . fear . . .
aggression. The dark side of the Force are they. Easily they flow, quick to join you in a fight. If
once you start down the dark path, forever will it dominate your destiny, consume you it
will . . . .”).
53. This is, admittedly, a bit of tongue in cheek allusion to the “canons of construction”
often deployed by New Textualists.
54. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (plurality opinion); see also
Justice Elena Kagan, supra note 51 (“[W]e’re all textualists now.”).
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Textualists deploy the hypocrisy canon to insist purposivist or intentionalist
readings are illegitimate: the competing approach is so flawed and unprinci-
pled that it is anathema to statutory interpretation as a whole and should be
discarded. Much like Justice Scalia’s former disruptive style on the bench,55
New Textualists use these loud and underhanded rhetorical tactics to drown
out the opposition.
For example, I can disagree with New Textualism’s methods for a variety
of reasons. But I would not argue that it is an illegitimate approach to statu-
tory interpretation. New Textualism does bring some good ideas to the ta-
ble.56 Rather, it’s the rhetorical absolutism brought by many, but not all, New
Textualists that is so troubling.57 Saying an opposing viewpoint is illegitimate
implies it has nothing to offer and is a nonsensical point of view. This Com-
ment now turns to examples of New Textualists deploying the hypocrisy
canon.
1. Reading Law and the Canons of Construction
The first example is the seminal book Reading Law, by Justice Antonin
Scalia and linguist Bryan Garner.58 The book is a leading treatise on New
Textualism and statutory interpretation.59 But the book is premised on the
use of the hypocrisy canon. Scalia and Garner advance their misleading ar-
gument that sticking to the text will constrain judges and provide uniform-
ity,60 while deeming purposivism and other approaches illegitimate
throughout the treatise.61
The core argument is hollow for multiple reasons. Scalia and Garner’s
goal is to codify the New Textualist interpretive techniques and provide a
workable and constraining set of principles. This sounds helpful in theory.
The book, however, fails to provide any applicable framework for a New
55. See Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideology,
and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 Va. L. Rev. 1379, 1433 (2017) (noting
that Justice Scalia interrupted Justice Breyer “at such an extraordinary rate as to dwarf all other
interruptions” by other justices).
56. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 113, 116–18
(describing how a New Purposivist approach to statutory interpretation could incorporate
textualist elements to create a better doctrine).
57. To be fair, John F. Manning (a prominent textualist) has attempted to bridge the gap
between the two doctrines. See id.; see also John F. Manning, Essay in Honor of Justice Gins-
burg, Justice Ginsburg and the New Legal Process, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 455, 458 (2013) (“Justice
Ginsburg relied heavily on statutory purpose. But in contrast with the Old Legal Process ap-
proach that once prevailed, her approach did not treat purpose as a freestanding concept.”).
58. Scalia & Garner, supra note 1.
59. The book is now a regular reference on the Court according to Justice Kagan. Justice
Elena Kagan, supra note 51. According to Professor Mendelson’s research, the book has “been
cited 15 times in the Supreme Court, 103 times in opinions of the lower federal courts, and
108 times in state courts.” Mendelson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 5 n.15).
60. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 16–18.
61. Id. at 15–28, 343–410.
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Textualist interpretation. The treatise is over 500 pages62 and describes 57
different canons of construction,63 but it is devoid of any guidance on how
to use them.64 Nothing in the book tells a user when to use canons, how
many canons to use, or whether a hierarchy exists. The only overarching
principle is “[n]o canon of interpretation is absolute.”65 The inherent ambi-
guity of language, coupled with the lack of a coherent interpretive regime
supplied by New Textualists, is ripe for chaos.
These abstract concerns about the canons play out in practice as well.
Empirical research on the usage of canons at the Supreme Court demon-
strates that the lack of a cohesive hierarchy or framework to guide canon
usage creates inconsistent results.66 Unlike states that have codified methods
of statutory interpretation,67 New Textualists have not, and perhaps cannot,
create a proper hierarchy. Due to the large number of interpretive canons
and the different (and, at times, conflicting) results that each canon can
produce, the fight now is which canons are proper for a given case.68 Con-
founding the issue, the Court appears to be creating and eliminating canons
as time goes by.69
Yates v. United States is an excellent example of what a case involving
statutory interpretation looks like when a court uses the approach advocated
by Scalia and Garner.70 In Yates, the Court needed to determine whether a
fish counted as a “tangible object” under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.71 Both the
plurality (authored by Justice Ginsburg) and dissenting (authored by Justice
Kagan) opinions invoked a host of canons in support of their positions.
62. See generally Scalia & Garner, supra note 1.
63. Id. at 51.
64. The authors fail to provide a coherent framework for prioritizing and applying the
canons. See generally Scalia & Garner, supra note 1.
65. Id. at 59. This “fundamental principle” appears to be included as a response to Karl
Llewellyn’s article from 1950, in which he demonstrated for each canon of statutory construc-
tion, there is a equal and conflicting canon. Karl N. Llewellyn, Symposium, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401–06 (1950). In this section, the two authors declare that although the
canons “can be abused . . . we should hardly abandon them.” Scalia & Garner, supra note 1,
at 61. One wonders why legislative history does not deserve the same treatment.
66. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 825,
849 (2017) (finding inconsistency in the deployment of interpretive canons across justices on
the Roberts Court). And this is not due to inexperienced use by nontextualists. Rather, justices
of all ideologies “cherry-pick” canons as needed. See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 534; see also
Mendelson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 6–7). It is likely that the number of semantic canons
reduces the need for substantive canons, such as the absurdity canon, since there is more room
to operate within the scope of the text. Cf. Krishnakumar, supra at 847–49 (finding that sub-
stantive canons are not frequently invoked by the Roberts Court).
67. Gluck, supra note 12, at 1754.
68. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (plurality opinion); see also
Mendelson, supra note 11, (manuscript at 25–48).
69. Mendelson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 36–37).
70. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1074.
71. Id. at 1078–79.
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Justice Ginsburg deployed the noscitur a sociis72 and ejusdem generis73 canons
in addition to relying on the statute’s purpose, dictionaries, and the rule of
lenity.74 Justice Kagan, by contrast, deployed the whole code and whole act
canons.75 Neither side gives an inch in the interpretive war and neither pro-
vides substantial justification regarding their choice of canons. There is still a
“prevailing confusion”76—the “war never changes,”77 only the weapons of
interpretation do.
This inconsistency reveals how New Textualism and Justice Scalia’s ca-
nons allow judges significant freedom to interpret a statute.78 This reduces
predictability in statutory interpretation and increases the possibility of judi-
cial activism.79 Far from providing uniformity and stability, the data suggests
Scalia’s canons do little to end the “prevailing confusion.” They may even
add to it.
Even among the canons that are used consistently, there are problems.
The most widely deployed canon at the Supreme Court level, expressio
unius,80 is used in no more than 17.6% of statutory interpretation cases.81
Disturbingly, empirical research suggests that congressional staffers reject
three of the top five82 most commonly discussed canons by the Supreme
Court.83 That is, drafters of legislation either do not follow the canon’s rule
(because they are unaware of it) or draft in a manner that is opposite to the
canon’s rule (because they’re appealing to other stakeholders).
In addition to advocating for the use of their canons, Scalia and Garner
devote a substantial portion of the book to delegitimizing other methods
and sources of interpretation. The two authors describe the other methods
of interpretation as ones which widely neglect text, which has “impaired the
72. A word is known by the company it keeps. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at
434–35.
73. General words following a list of specific words should usually be read in light of
those specific words. See id. at 428.
74. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081–89.
75. Id. at 1090–1101 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
76. Assuming there ever was a prevailing confusion.
77. Cf. Fallout 3 (Bethesda Softworks 2008) (“War. War never changes.”).
78. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J.
1083, 1153–56 (2008) (finding that despite the use of canons, the “data strongly suggest that
ideology plays a powerful and pervasive role in shaping Supreme Court decisions with regard
to agency statutory interpretations” even among staunch textualists).
79. See Gluck, supra note 12, at 183–87.
80. The inclusion of a term is to the exclusion of another term. In other words, specifi-
cally including a term means that all other specific terms are excluded. Scalia & Garner,
supra note 1, app. B at 428.
81. Mendelson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 26) (finding that expressio unius is dis-
cussed, not necessarily applied, in only 18.5% of statutory interpretation cases).
82. Expressio unius, 18.5%; Whole Act Rule, 15.3%; Rule Against Surplusage, 13.3%. Id.
83. See id. (manuscript at 4) (citing Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and
the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013)).
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predictability of legal dispositions, . . . weakened our democratic processes,”
and “distorted our system of governmental checks and balances.”84 Scalia
and Garner describe the use of the “spirit” of a statute (as opposed to the
letter) as a “bald assertion of an unspecified and hence unbounded judicial
power to ignore what the law says, leading to ‘completely unforeseeable and
unreasonable results.’ ”85 This blustery rhetoric shows usage of the hypocrisy
canon. Scalia and Garner are not merely advocating that their method of
interpretation is right and others are wrong. Rather, they’re attempting to
delegitimize all other methods as unprincipled. The two authors use rhetoric
when substance fails.
2. The Rule Against Surplusage
Reading Law is full of specific examples of the hypocrisy canon. Perhaps
the most egregious is Scalia and Garner’s faith in the surplusage canon and
their treatment of legislative history. The authors advance a hollow argu-
ment about the rule against surplusage while demonizing legislative history
(and any method of interpretation that uses it) as illegitimate.
The rule against surplusage is: “if possible, every word and every provi-
sion is to be given effect.”86 In other words, courts should strain to provide
each word in a statute with an independent meaning, even if multiple words
or provisions appear identical on their face. The canon is one of the most
widely used semantic canons of construction87 and has widespread accept-
ance (especially at the Supreme Court level).88 But this argument is concern-
ing due to the fact that legislative drafters often follow an opposite rule.89
Legislative drafters purposely add in surplus terms in a belt and suspenders
approach to ensure that their intended meaning gets across.90 Legislative
drafters stated that they “intentionally err on the side of redundancy to ‘cap-
ture the universe’ or ‘because you just want to be sure you hit it.’”91 On top
of that, “politically for compromise they must include certain words in the
statute—that senator, that constituent, that lobbyist wants to see that
word[,] . . . and they might overlap.”92 Scalia and Garner seem aware of this
fact,93 but their response is that “[s]tatutes should be carefully drafted” and
84. Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at xxvii.
85. Id. at 343 (quoting Frederick J. de Sloovère, Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11
N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 538, 542 (1934)).
86. Id. app. B at 440.
87. Mendelson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 26).
88. Id. (manuscript at 28).
89. Eskridge, supra note 6, at 573.
90. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 83, at 934–36 (“[E]ven in short statutes—indeed,
even within single sections of statutes . . . terms are often purposefully redundant to satisfy
audiences other than courts.”).
91. Id. at 934.
92. Id..
93. Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 179.
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that legislators “ought to hire eagle-eyed editors” to avoid this problem.94
This is a nonresponse in the face of adverse empirical evidence.
While trumpeting a fallacious argument about the rule against surplus-
age, the authors also attack the use of legislative history. The authors de-
scribe the use of legislative history as a “crapshoot.”95 They claim it is “not
just wrong; it violates constitutional requirements of nondelegability, bicam-
eralism, presidential participation, and the supremacy of judicial interpreta-
tion.”96 Reading Law claims—without evidence—that legislative history
exists today because courts refer to it, not the other way around.97 In other
words, legislators only engage in floor debates in an attempt to “induce
courts to accept their views about how the statute works.”98 All of this rheto-
ric is designed to make any use of legislative history illegitimate, and in the
view of New Textualists, it taints any mode of interpretation that deploys it.
As before, this is not a normal disagreement with other methods. It’s an
assault on the very legitimacy of these other methods. This is an unmerited
rhetorical assault on the use of legislative history.99
3. Dictionaries
Dictionaries also play a role in the New Textualist hypocrisy canon. As
the Court turns away from other sources of information in recent decades,
dictionaries are increasingly important.100 They often play a key role in New
Textualist interpretation, since they lend credence to the “plain meaning” so
desired. To obtain the “plain meaning” of a given word or statute, New Tex-
tualists (and increasingly the Supreme Court as a whole) often turn to dic-
tionaries as an external—but neutral and constrained—source of
information.101 Dictionaries possess an “aura of authority” that New Textu-
alists are eager to latch onto.102
But the basic premise here is faulty. Dictionaries do not provide a uni-
versal plain meaning.103 Rather, dictionaries provide descriptions of words
deprived of context. Different dictionaries provide different and conflicting
definitions. For example, in MCI Telecommunications Corp.,104 the issue was
94. Id. (second emphasis added).
95. Id. at 389.
96. Id. at 388.
97. Id. at 377.
98. Id. Remarkably, the two authors provide little support for this assertion.
99. See infra note 152–153 and accompanying text.
100. See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 483, 486–90 (2013).
101. Id. at 490, 494.
102. See Phillip A. Rubin, Note, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in
Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60 Duke L.J. 167, 176 (2010).
103. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 100, at 490.
104. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
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whether “modify” meant to change moderately or fundamentally.105 The
majority found “widespread” agreement among dictionaries that “modify”
meant to “change moderately or in minor fashion.”106 But the petitioners
found the conflicting definition of “to make a basic or important change” in
Webster’s Third and other Webster’s dictionaries—a conflict that indicated
ambiguity.107 Consulting dictionaries provided no semantic silver bullet to
settle the debate. Consequently, even among words that appear relatively
settled, the use of dictionaries typically only adds to the uncertainty.108 The
“meaning” given to words is static and dependent on the arcane world of
dictionary compilation.109
Judges also routinely use dictionaries without a proper understanding of
how they are compiled and their inherent limitations.110 For example, judges
often refer to the order in which definitions are supplied for a given word,
believing that the definitions are presented in order from the most to the
least common usage.111 But dictionaries are not always compiled in this way.
The order of definitions can reflect a host of differing meanings, ranging
from historical order to structural coherence.112 Most concerning, the dic-
tionaries most often cited by the Supreme Court do not use word frequency
when compiling definitions.113 Judges glean intricate information about
“plain meaning” from sources they do not understand.
Judges also routinely fall into the trap of relying on a single dictionary
as their source of plain meaning. Justice Scalia was particularly fond of Web-
ster’s Second New International Dictionary114 but disliked Webster’s Third
New International, since it was “notoriously permissive.”115 By only using
one dictionary, judges rely on a closed universe of information. Similar is-
sues arise when judges do not use dictionaries consistently but instead
search for definitions that support their arguments.116 The fear of judicial
cherry-picking is omnipresent when judges have a variety of different (and
often conflicting) sources of “authority.”117
105. Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30
Ariz. St. L.J. 275, 325–26 (1998).
106. Id. (quoting MCI Telecomms., 512 U.S. at 225).
107. Id. (quoting MCI Telecomms., 512 U.S. at 225–26, 226 n.2).
108. See id.
109. See generally Brudney & Baum, supra note 100 (examining the Court’s increased
reliance upon dictionary definitions, reflecting a casual form of opportunistic conduct).
110. Id. at 490.
111. Id. at 514–15.
112. Id. at 513–14.
113. Id. at 514.
114. Id. at 489.
115. Id. at 509 (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, app. A at 418).
116. Id. at 566–67.
117. See Aprill, supra note 105, at 313.
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For example, in Muscarello v. United States,118 the dissent and majority
argued over the correct use of the word “carries” in relation to a concealed
weapons statute.119 Justice Breyer, for the majority, consulted seven different
dictionaries,120 the King James Bible,121 Moby Dick,122 and the Arkansas Ga-
zette123 to bolster the conclusion that “carries” included a gun in a locked
glove compartment. Most notably for our purposes, Justice Breyer pointed
out and drew meaning from the fact that the majority’s definition of “car-
ries” was the first given meaning in the Oxford English Dictionary, while the
dissent’s definition was the twenty-sixth given meaning.124 After this exhaus-
tive list, the majority then turned to legislative history and statutory purpose
to finalize their conclusion that the phrase “carries a firearm” included a gun
in a locked glove compartment.125
The dissent, by Justice Ginsburg, responded to this barrage of informa-
tion by stating, “[u]nlike the Court, I do not think dictionaries, surveys of
press reports, or the Bible tell us, dispositively, what ‘carries’ means embed-
ded in § 924(c)(1).”126 To prove this point, Justice Ginsburg proceeded to list
her own conflicting historical and literary sources before concluding,
“[t]hese and the Court’s lexicological sources demonstrate vividly that
‘carry’ is a word commonly used to convey various messages.”127 Interest-
ingly, Justice Scalia joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent despite on numerous
other occasions citing dictionaries favorably, or in a blocking manner.128
This inconsistency became something of a pattern for Justice Scalia,
who, depending on the situation, either excoriated the opposition for relying
too heavily on dictionary definitions129 or himself placed outsize importance
118. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
119. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126–27. Specifically, the issue was whether a gun in a locked
glove compartment was “carried” in a drug transaction, which would impose mandatory
minimums under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012).
120. The dictionaries are the Oxford English Dictionary, Webster’s Third International Dic-
tionary, Random House Dictionary, the Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology, the Oxford Diction-
ary of English Etymology, Black’s Law Dictionary, and Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms. Id. at
128, 130, 135.
121. Id. at 129.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 130.
124. Id. at 128, 130. As stated above, the order in which words are listed is not a ranking
of usage. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 100, at 513–14.
125. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 132–35.
126. Id. at 142–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
127. Id. at 143–44.
128. See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1437, 1439 (1994) (“Justice Scalia has been the most willing to employ dictionaries”); see, e.g.,
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding, based on a single
dictionary definition, that there is “little doubt that the ordinary meaning of ‘representatives’
does not include judges, see Webster’s Second New International Dictionary 2114 (1950)”).
129. See Aprill, supra note 105, at 318–21.
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on dictionary definitions.130 In the words of one scholar, “where the diction-
ary definitions can be read to narrow the governmental power, Justice Scalia
treats the dictionary definition as if it revealed the one ordinary meaning . . .
[but] Justice Scalia rejects dictionary definitions in other opinions, at least
when they . . . broaden[ ] the power of government.”131
This all fits the hypocrisy canon, since New Textualists often use diction-
aries to argue that their meanings are the most “fair” or “plain.”132 They
claim their method of interpretation is more constraining on judges due to
these inherent limitations provided by text and sources such as dictiona-
ries.133 But while they rail against the use of legislative history and purpose
as unhinged and illegitimate,134 the use of dictionaries allows for the same
judicial cherry-picking of preferred information that New Textualists claim
to abhor.135 Much like the canons of construction described in Reading
Law,136 the lack of a cohesive framework and judicial discipline robs diction-
aries of their usefulness and any constraining effect they may possess.
4. “Harm” and the Endangered Species Act Case
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,137
a group of homeowners in Oregon sued the Department of the Interior
based on the Department’s broad interpretation of the word “harm” from
130. See id. at 325–27, 329–30.
131. Id. at 318; see also Note, supra note 128, at 1447–48 (“Justice Scalia, for example, has
referred to the 1950 edition of Webster’s Second in four cases during the past three years, to
other editions of Webster’s Second in two cases, and to Webster’s Third in two cases, with no
evident relationship between the age of the dictionary and that of the statute under considera-
tion.”) (footnotes omitted). But see Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed,
of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be
drawn from the context in which it is used.’ ”) (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129,
132 (1993)); Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 417–18 (“[A] comparative weighing of dic-
tionaries is often necessary.”).
132. See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–69 (2012) (where
Justice Alito consults numerous dictionaries to confirm his interpretation that the word “inter-
preter” does not include document translation services); TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin.
Review Bd., 833 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also A. Ray-
mond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 71, 72 (1994); Rubin supra note 102, at 168 (“Dictionary usage is
particularly important in textualist analysis, which seeks to find ‘a sort of “objectified” in-
tent . . .’ and places foremost priority on the text itself, as opposed to utilizing external sources
of understanding.”) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpre-
tation: Federal Courts and the Law 17 (1997)); Note, supra note 128, at 1440 (“The
Court’s growing faith in dictionaries is tied to a broader methodological shift toward textual-
ism in statutory interpretation.”).
133. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 100, at 577.
134. See, e.g., Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 343, 369–90 (“Legislative history creates
mischief both coming and going.”).
135. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 100, at 491.
136. See supra Section II.A.1.
137. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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the Endangered Species Act.138 The majority agreed with the Department
and held that the word “harm” can include “significant habitat modification
and degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife” and “indirect
takings.”139
Justice Scalia wrote a blistering dissent. He argued that the Department
and majority’s interpretation “makes nonsense of the word that ‘harm’ de-
fines”140 and “defined [the] term in a manner repugnant to its ordinary and
traditional sense.”141 This stinging rhetoric, and the justice’s reasoning in his
dissent, is an example of the hypocrisy canon. He advanced a questionable
argument before attacking the majority’s use of legislative history as
illegitimate.
When confronted with conflicting information, Scalia dug in.142 He at-
tempted to poke holes in the majority’s reasoning through a variety of tex-
tual arguments. As for the conflicting information, the Justice responded,
“[t]here is little fear . . . that giving no effect to the relevant portions of the
Committee Reports will frustrate the real-life expectations of . . . Congress.
If they read and relied on such tedious detail on such an obscure point . . .
the Republic would be in grave peril.”143 Like with the canon against sur-
plusage above, this is a nonresponse in the face of adverse reasoning. Justice
Scalia simultaneously advocated for Congress to hire “eagle-eyed editors”144
to ensure legislative precision and downplayed the importance of details in
statutory interpretation.145 The justice could not have it both ways, despite
his loud rhetoric.
After advancing this inconsistent argument, the late justice then contin-
ued to attack the majority’s use of legislative history as an illegitimate exer-
cise. He stated that the legislative history did not support the majority’s
position “[e]ven if legislative history were a legitimate and reliable tool of
interpretation . . . and even if it could appropriately be resorted to when the
enacted text is as clear as this .”146 The justice here did not merely disagree
with the reasoning of the majority and the Department. Rather, Scalia found
their opinion and their methods altogether illegitimate.
These examples demonstrate that New Textualists, inspired by Justice
Scalia, frequently utilize the hypocrisy canon in their rhetoric.
138. Id. at 692.
139. Id. at 708.
140. Id. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 714 (or as the Justice states, “the simplest farmer who finds his land con-
scripted to national zoological use”).
143. Id. at 730–31.
144. Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 179.
145. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 730–31.
146. Id. at 726 (emphases added).
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B. The “Ad Hominem Canon”147
New Textualists often refuse to answer opposing arguments on their
merits.148 Rather, New Textualists routinely attack the source of information,
instead of its substance.149 This is the “ad hominem canon.”150 The ad
hominem canon is deployed when a New Textualist refuses to engage with
any of the underlying substance of an opposing method of interpretation
and instead dismisses the argument as illegitimate.151 The central problem
with this argument is that legislative history152 and statutory purpose153 are
legitimate. And unlike Justice Scalia’s canons, a workable hierarchy and sys-
tem of interpretation has been proposed for the use of legislative history.154
As Section II.A demonstrated, many of the same issues with purposivism
and intentionalism also plague New Textualism.
This rhetorical canon is designed to distract from the deficiencies of the
New Textualist approach. It’s a rhetorical cheap shot. Instead of refuting the
arguments presented by the opposing method of interpretation, usage of this
canon shows the weaknesses undergirding New Textualism. Similar to the
147. There may be some overlap between rhetorical canons of construction, since they are
not meant to be hermetically sealed from one another. Parts of one canon may influence
others, and all share some commonality. For example, a phrase uttered by a proponent of a
method of interpretation could fit both the hypocrisy and ad hominem canons.
148. See, e.g., infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2, II.B.3.
149. See infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2, II.B.3.
150. This canon is much akin to the “ad hominem” attack, where a proponent attacks the
personal traits of an opponent instead of the merits of their argument. The ad hominem
canon, however, occurs when the user refuses to consider the merits of an argument because
the argument is derived from disagreeable sources.
151. See, e.g., infra Section II.B.1, II.B.2, II.B.3.
152. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History:
Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 117, 117 (2008) (noting
that after “analyzing all 320-plus majority opinions in workplace law authored by eight liberal
Justices from 1969-2006, the authors establish that legislative history reliance is actually associ-
ated with a constraining set of results”); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70, 72 (2012) (“Legislative his-
tory’s fires still burn.”); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public
materials, including the background of Rule 609(a)(1) and the legislative history of its adop-
tion . . . .”).
153. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70,
97 (2006) (“[I]n our constitutional system, courts have responsibility for seeing that a statute’s
apparent purposes are fulfilled.” (citing Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 Harv. L.
Rev. 388, 394–95 (1942))). Professor John F. Manning argues for the New Purposivist ap-
proach to statutory interpretation, which includes some textualist principles to limit the outer
bound of construction (and avoid a Holy Trinity situation). See Manning, supra note 56, at 118
(“But if one accepts that Congress legislates at many different levels of generality and that the
resulting differences reflect evident choices about how much discretion to leave to judges and
administrators, then fidelity to legislative purpose in a system of legislative supremacy requires
interpreters to respect Congress’s choice of means.”).
154. Nourse, supra note 152, at 90–128 (detailing “simple principles” for the use of legis-
lative history).
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hypocrisy canon, when New Textualists deploy the ad hominem canon,
they’re attempting to end the interpretive debate when it becomes difficult.
Akin to someone ignoring a phone call because they fear bad news, this
technique allows New Textualists to ignore information that may weaken
their argument. This Comment next considers examples of New Textualists
deploying the ad hominem canon.
1. The Frozen Trucker Case
In TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board,155 a trucker
forced to the side of the road during a snowstorm faced a crucial choice:
abandon his trailer or stay in the cab and wait for help.156 The trucker, fear-
ing hypothermia, left the trailer and was later fired.157 He subsequently
brought a whistleblower action against TransAm Trucking. In the Tenth Cir-
cuit, the case hinged on the meaning of the term “operate” within the Sur-
face Transportation Assistance Act (STAA).158 TransAm argued that because
the trucker did “operate” his truck to drive away when he was instructed to
wait for help, he did not fall within the “refusal to operate” whistleblower
provisions of the STAA.159 The majority found for the trucker: it held that
the term “operate” was not defined in the statute, and it deferred to the
Department of Labor’s interpretation under Chevron deference.160
Then-Judge Neil Gorsuch’s dissent, deploying the ad hominem canon,
disagreed and found the statute to be unambiguous and favoring the em-
ployer.161 Based on this supposed plain meaning, Gorsuch believed there was
no need to consult additional sources to confirm his interpretation.162 The
dissent devoted a paragraph to listing all of the reasons why legislative his-
tory and statutory purpose are not useful sources of information.163 Gorsuch
sang the standard New Textualist refrain that “[e]ven supposing all this is
true, though, when the statute is plain it simply isn’t our business to appeal
to legislative intentions.”164 In other words: “Yes, you may be right. This
piece of information points us to a certain decision—but that doesn’t matter
because the source is tainted.” It’s an attempt to use pure rhetoric to advance
an argument instead of a substantive argument.
This did not answer the majority’s argument on the merits. Rather, it’s a
rhetorical cop-out that is deployed when the user attacks the source of the
155. 833 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2016).
156. TransAm, 833 F.3d at 1208–09.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 1210–13.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 1215–17 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1217.
164. Id. One wonders if legislative intentions could be gleaned from legislative history, but
that is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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argument. Gorsuch relies on a single dictionary to reach his conclusion that
the meaning of the term “operate” is unambiguous.165 These other sources
of information are conflicting and weaken Gorsuch’s conclusion from the
single dictionary. His response is merely, “It is a well-documented mis-
take . . . to assume that a statute pursues its putative (or even announced)
purposes to their absolute and seemingly logical ends.”166 This is not a re-
sponse to the merits of the majority’s argument. Rather, it’s an ad
hominem-style logical failing.
2. The LSD Case
The majority opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook in the “LSD Case” is
another example of the ad hominem canon. In United States v. Marshall167
defendants charged with possession of LSD faced draconian minimum pen-
alties due to the wording of the sentencing statute.168 The statute imposed
penalties of “five years for selling more than one gram of a ‘mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount’ of LSD, [and] ten years for more
than ten grams.”169 The crux of the issue was whether a single dose of LSD170
mixed with another substance (such as blotter paper) constituted a “mix-
ture” under the terms of the statute. This had enormous consequences for
sentencing, since theoretically, a single dose of LSD, dissolved in a “tumbler
of orange juice,”171 could result in a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence,
since it was technically a “mixture.”172 Consequently, holding a single dose
of LSD, depending on the mixture, could increase a sentence from minor
possession to a mandatory minimum of ten years in federal prison.
Judge Frank Easterbrook, a New Textualist173 writing for the majority,
read the statute literally. He wrote that “[o]rdinary parlance calls the paper
containing tiny crystals of LSD a mixture.”174 But Judge Easterbook ignored
165. Id. at 1216.
166. Id. at 1217.
167. 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (in banc) (colloquially known as “the LSD Case”) aff’d
sub. nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
168. Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1314–15; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v)–(B)(v) (2012). The pri-
mary defendant at issue was sentenced to a mandatory twenty-year sentence for selling over
ten grams of LSD (approximately 11,750 doses). Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1314.
169. Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1315.
170. LSD is extremely light (the average dose is 0.05 milligrams) and is almost always
delivered through another medium. Id. at 1315–16.
171. Id. at 1315.
172. Id. There are also additional consequences. A low-level dealer (a “small-fish”) could
technically be charged with significantly higher penalties than a distributor, who may only
have pure LSD (since the dealer would have the weighty “mixtures”).
173. Easterbrook, supra note 48, at xxi–xxvi. Judge Easterbrook gives a full-throated en-
dorsement of the treatise by Scalia and Garner, stating “[e]very lawyer—and every citizen
concerned about how the judiciary can rise above politics and produce a government of laws,
and not of men—should find this book invaluable.” Id. at xxvi (footnote omitted).
174. Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1317.
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sources outside the four corners of the text. The overall purpose of the stat-
ute was to “punish major drug traffickers more harshly than minor partici-
pants.”175 Subsequent legislative history demonstrated that Congress did not
intend the illogical result of the statute.176 Even the Sentencing Commission
was not sure if LSD should be punished by weight or dose and asked Con-
gress for further guidelines.177 For PCP, a drug distributed in a similar man-
ner to LSD, “Congress specified alternative weights, for the drug itself and
for the substance or mixture containing the drug.”178 Not persuaded by these
sources outside the text, the court upheld the sentences, despite the illogical
outcome that was likely contrary to the results intended by the drafters.179
The opinion by Judge Easterbrook deployed the ad hominem canon: it
was willfully blind to the broad purpose of the statute, later legislative his-
tory, and the illogical outcome. Although the opinion briefly acknowledged
some of the congressional developments, it stated, “subsequent debates are
not a ground for avoiding the import of enactments.”180 This is not a re-
sponse to the merits of the argument raised by the two dissenting opinions.
Rather, it is an ad hominem–style rhetorical attack on the source of their
information. Later legislative developments, while not by any means con-
trolling, may be a source of information that demonstrates congressional
intent. As “faithful agents” of the legislature,181 any source of information
that might shed light on the intent of the legislature would appear to be
useful. Judge Easterbrook further stated, “[j]udges assess the validity of legis-
lative decisions; we do not assign grades to legislative deliberations. . . . Even
laws that resulted from mistakes in the drafting process or ignorance in the
halls of Congress survive if a rational basis may be supplied for the result.”182
Judge Easterbrook said this because it was an easier answer than engaging
with the dissents on their merits. He used rhetoric to ignore the dissenters’
arguments based in nontextual sources and covered up the deficiencies in his
own argument.
3. The “Unknowing” Felon Case
United States v. Games-Perez183 involved a question about 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from knowingly possessing firearms.184
The question at issue was whether the mens rea requirement of knowledge
175. Id. at 1330 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 1327–28.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1332 (Posner, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 1314–15, 1326 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 1318.
181. This is how New Textualists often view the role of the court—“faithful agents” of the
legislature. Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 22–23.
182. Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1325.
183. 667 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2012).
184. Id. at 1137.
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also applied to the felony requirement185—that is, whether the government
needed to prove that the defendant actually knew he was a felon in order to
get a conviction. The majority held there was no knowledge requirement for
felony status and affirmed the conviction.186
Concurring in judgment, then-Judge Gorsuch deployed the ad
hominem canon and summarily dismissed the Fourth Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of the statute,187 since it “wage[d] an epic battle not on the field of plain
language but congressional intent.”188 He continued and declared that the
Fourth Circuit’s “extensive back-and-forth barrages ultimately serve to illus-
trate only that the relevant legislative history is stocked with ample artillery
for everyone.”189 This shows usage of the ad hominem canon, since he re-
fused to engage in any sort of analysis or explanation about the argument
advanced from the Fourth Circuit decision. Rather, then-Judge Gorsuch
stated, “Whatever Congress’s intent may have been, any statutory interpreta-
tion must take reasonable account of the language Congress actually
adopted.”190 Indeed, he made his point clear: your analysis does not matter
and will (and should) be ignored if based on legislative history or statutory
purpose. This is not a response to the argument of the Fourth Circuit on the
merits. Rather, it’s an attack on the process and source of their decision. Jus-
tice Gorsuch, like Scalia before him, chose to assault the use of legislative
history instead of responding to the actual arguments.
From the LSD Case to Games-Perez, these examples show New Textual-
ists deploying the ad hominem canon by refusing to engage with the merits
of an opposing side because of the source of their arguments. This makes
sense: outside sources of information may often conflict with a New Textual-
ist interpretation of a given term or phrase. It’s easier (and appears more
persuasive) to claim that the entire source of information is illegitimate and
not worth engaging. But in the end, using the ad hominem canon is a rhe-
torical trick, not a substantive argument.
C. The “Cocktail Party Canon”
New Textualists often claim that their approach stays true to the most
“ordinary,”191 “plain,”192 or “fair”193 meaning of a given statutory text. In
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
188. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d at 1144 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 69–77 (the “Ordinary-Meaning Canon”).
192. Id. app. B at 436 (“The doctrine that if the text of a statute is unambiguous, it should
be applied by its terms without recourse to policy arguments, legislative history, and any other
matter extraneous to the text . . . .”).
193. Id. at 33 (“The interpretive approach we endorse is that of the ‘fair reading’: deter-
mining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable
reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was
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other words, New Textualists claim that their interpretation, interpretive
method, and result would be easy to understand in a lay context and is the
fairest reading of the statute. This is the “cocktail party canon,” derived from
Justice Scalia’s famous quip about finding interpretations that would make
“sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you funny.”194 One
of the principle canons in Reading Law is the “Ordinary-Meaning Canon,”
which tells users that “[w]ords are to be understood in their ordinary, every-
day meanings.”195
Claiming a “plain meaning” is a rhetorical tactic that allows New Textu-
alists to claim the interpretive high ground. The framework includes the
cocktail party canon, since it appeals to the fantasy of a simple plain mean-
ing understood by an average person. But simple does not always mean cor-
rect. There may be multiple simple readings of a statute. New Textualists
deploy this canon in an attempt to shut down the flow of information that
contradicts their position.196 By claiming that their method has the “plain-
est” reading of the provision at issue, New Textualists see no need to address
supplemental information that might call their proposition into question.197
When the text is plain (at least in the mind of the New Textualist), the in-
quiry reaches its end. But New Textualists fail to understand that what may
be very plain to them and their friends at a high-end cocktail party may not
be so plain to others. A term with obvious meaning to Justice Scalia may
have an entirely different meaning to a bar full of truckers.198 A meaning is
only plain in the eye of the beholder.
1. The Chemical “Warfare” in Pennsylvania Case
Bond v. United States199 is an unusual and somewhat bizarre case. After
attempting to harass her husband’s paramour (Myrlinda Haynes) with
chemical irritants,200 a woman (Ms. Carol Ann Bond) was charged with vio-
lating the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.201 The Act,
as its name suggests, is designed to implement an international ban on
issued.”); see also id. at 356 (“the fair meaning of the text” is the “textualist’s touchstone”
(emphasis omitted)).
194. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 69.
196. See, e.g., infra Sections II.C.1, II.C.2, II.C.3.
197. Id.
198. See supra Section II.B.1 (the TransAm trucking case is an excellent example of how a
term may be interpreted differently in different circles).
199. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
200. Although the chemicals used by Bond could be lethal in high doses, the parties
agreed “that Bond did not intend to kill [the paramour].” Id. at 2085.
201. Id. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act is the domestic legisla-
tion that enacts the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpil-
ing, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Id. at 2083. The Convention was
in response to a longstanding horror at the use of chemical weapons during warfare, most
recently highlighted by the Iraqi Army’s use during the Iran-Iraq War. Id. at 2083–84. The
domestic Act
1508 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1485
chemical weapons in warfare.202 In this case, one of the chemicals Ms. Bond
used was available to purchase on Amazon.com, the other she obtained at
the lab where she worked.203 While both chemicals could be fatal at high
enough doses, it was undisputed that Ms. Bond’s goal was to give Ms.
Haynes “an uncomfortable rash.”204 The chemicals Ms. Bond used were so
benign that over an eight-month period, Ms. Bond’s twenty-four attempts
to injure Ms. Haynes resulted in one minor chemical burn, which Ms.
Haynes treated with running tap water.205 On its face, the case against Ms.
Bond was fairly simple, since she “ ‘knowingly’ ‘use[d]’ a ‘chemical weapon’
in violation of section 229(a).”206 Further, “[t]he chemicals that Bond placed
on Haynes’s home and car are ‘toxic chemical[s]’ as defined by the statute,
and Bond’s attempt to assault Haynes was not a ‘peaceful purpose.’”207 Al-
though the Court unanimously decided that the Act did not apply to Ms.
Bond, the reasoning splintered the justices.208 Chief Justice Roberts, writing
for the majority, found ambiguity in the statute and applied a federalism-
avoidance construction.209 Justice Scalia, however, filed a concurrence on
different grounds.210
This concurrence by Justice Scalia in Bond exemplified the cocktail party
canon, since the late justice advocated an obvious “plain meaning” of the
term “chemical weapon” while accusing the plurality of being in a “result-
driven antitextualism [fog].”211 The first header in his opinion is titled the
“Unavoidable Meaning of the Text”212 and he finds the statute “utterly
Forbids any person knowingly ‘to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly
or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chem-
ical weapon.’ 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1). It defines ‘chemical weapon’ in relevant part as ‘[a]
toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited
under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose.’
§ 229F(1)(A). ‘Toxic chemical,’ in turn, is defined in general as ‘any chemical which
through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation
or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, regard-
less of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are
produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.’ § 229F(8)(A). Finally, ‘purposes not
prohibited by this chapter’ is defined as ‘[a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity,’ . . . .
Id. at 2085.
202. Id. at 2083–85.
203. Id. at 2085.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2088 (first quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229(a); then quoting id.; then quoting id.
§ 229(F)(1).
207. Id. (first quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(1) (2012); then quoting § 229F(8); and then quot-
ing § 229F(7)).
208. Id. at 2083–2111.
209. Id. at 2088–93.
210. Id. at 2094–2102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
211. Id. at 2094–95.
212. Id. at 2094.
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clear.”213 Justice Scalia argued that the “meaning of the Act is plain” and
“[a]pplying [the Act’s] provisions to this case is hardly complicated . . .
Bond violated the Act.”214 In Justice Scalia’s view, someone might look at
you funny at a cocktail party if you told them that a chemical weapons treaty
does not cover a woman in Pennsylvania who ordered a chemical used to
clean lab equipment from Amazon. Justice Scalia only escaped the result of
the “utterly clear” text by voiding the statute on constitutional grounds.215
But the meaning of the term “chemical weapon” is not so clear. A unan-
imous Court (although divided on the reasoning) found that the Act did not
apply to Ms. Bond.216 Justice Scalia, though, through the use of the cocktail
party canon, avoided what the statute, implementing a multinational treaty
drafted in response to horrific acts of war, was designed to prevent: the
spread of chemical weapons. By deploying the cocktail party canon, Justice
Scalia argued that the chemical weapons statute applied to a domestic dis-
pute in Pennsylvania and that his method of interpretation supplied the one
true plain interpretation.
2. The Return of the Frozen Trucker
Then-Judge Gorsuch’s dissent in TransAm also used the cocktail party
canon.  As described in Section II.B, the question turned on the interpreta-
tion of the word “operate” within a whistleblowing provision of a federal
safety statute. While the majority, an administrative law judge, and the De-
partment of Labor all found the term to be undefined and ambiguous, Judge
Gorsuch found the statute to be “perfectly plain.”217 Judge Gorsuch used this
“perfect plainness” to reach the “only” possible meaning of the statute: re-
fusing to “operate” only covers a literal refusal to operate the truck.218 In
other words, unless the trucker sat in his freezing cab and risked death while
the temperature continued to plunge, he was not covered by the statute’s
protections.
This is a clear usage of the cocktail party canon, since then-Judge Gor-
such believed his single literalist definition was the obvious and only “plain
meaning” of the statute.219 Any other definition fell outside the realm of the
text and was impermissible, or so the argument goes.220 This again ignored
the statutory-purpose and common-sense notion that refusing to wait in a
freezing cab and potentially dying from hypothermia is encompassed by the
213. Id. at 2096.
214. Id. at 2094 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 2098–2102.
216. See id. at 2082.
217. TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 833 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016).
218. Id.
219. See id. at 1215–17.
220. Id.
1510 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1485
term “refusal to operate.”221 Gorsuch never addressed why a refusal to “op-
erate” in the proscribed manner is not an additional possible meaning of the
statute (and creates ambiguity). But, since Gorsuch used the cocktail party
canon to find this meaning so plain, he avoided addressing these arguments.
The forceful rhetoric of this opinion glosses over the substantive ques-
tions. Then-Judge Gorsuch ignored other perspectives and ignored the fact
that this definition might cause him to get “funny looks” at any cocktail
party not made up of Supreme Court justices. The meaning of a given word
or phrase is only plain when the audience is composed of like-minded
people.
3. “Lawyer, Dog”
A recent concurrence in a denial of certiorari in the Louisiana Supreme
Court also uses the cocktail party canon and shows the dangers of using a
New Textualist mindset to discern plain meaning.222 When judges are em-
powered to decide the “plain meaning” based on their own perspective, they
lose touch with other perspectives outside their cocktail parties. In
Demesme, a suspect in custody stated, “just give me a lawyer dog.”223 But the
court found this to be an ambiguous request for counsel.224 In his concur-
rence to the denial of certiorari, Justice Crichton stated, “the defendant’s
ambiguous and equivocal reference to a ‘lawyer dog’ does not constitute an
invocation of counsel.”225
This is absurd. The only way this statement is ambiguous or equivocal is
if the court believes the suspect was asking for a dog with a law degree. New
Textualists, by encouraging judges to determine “plain meaning” based on
dictionary definitions and their own perspectives, rather than requiring ad-
ditional outside considerations,226 create a dangerous precedent that seri-
ously impacts the lives of people before courts.
A belief in a plain meaning presupposes there is a plain meaning. But
English is composed of many dialects, and Supreme Court justices (and
judges in general) likely only speak one or two of them.227 These dialects
emerge based on diverse factors such as race, class, and age. For example,
linguists identify a separate dialect from Standard English spoken by some
221. Id. at 1213.
222. State v. Demesme, 228 So. 3d 1206, 1206 (Crichton, J., concurring).
223. Id. Mr. Demesme’s full statement was, “if y’all, this is how I feel, if y’all think I did it,




226. Such as, in this example, how slang works.
227. A focus on plain, stilted English imposes a disproportionate impact on those who
speak a different dialect, due to class or race. Heather Pantoga, Injustice in Any Language: The
Need for Improved Standards Governing Courtroom Interpretation in Wisconsin, 82 Marq. L.
Rev. 601, 638–39 (1999).
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African-Americans as African-American Vernacular English.228 As a result,
while asking for a “lawyer, dog” may be “ambiguous” and “equivocal” in
Justice Crichton’s dialect,229 it may be clear-cut in another. In the words of
Justice Scalia, “he who lives by the ipse dixit dies by the ipse dixit.”230
D. And One More Example for the Road
One final example is Justice Scalia’s dissent in King v. Burwell,231 where
he deployed both the ad hominem and cocktail party canons. King v. Burwell
was the landmark case that upheld the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) tax
credits for federally established exchanges.232 The issue boiled down to
whether the ACA’s statutory phrase “an Exchange established by the
State”233 included exchanges established by the federal government for a re-
calcitrant state234 and whether individuals on these exchanges were eligible
for tax credits.235 If “an Exchange established by the State” excluded the fed-
eral exchanges, the entire ACA regime would likely have fallen apart.236 Con-
sequently, the Court—in light of the language of the other parts of the
ACA,237 practical realities,238 and the overall statutory scheme—found the
term to ambiguous.239 This ambiguity allowed the majority to hold that the
term “[e]stablished by the state” encompassed both state and federal ex-
changes—which therefore permitted the use of tax credits on all ex-
changes.240 This decision effectively saved the ACA.241
Justice Scalia, in a fiery dissent, vehemently disagreed; he deployed both
the cocktail party canon to reject the majority’s conclusion that the text was
228. Id.; see also Geoffrey K. Pullum, African American Vernacular English is Not Standard
English with Mistakes, in The Workings of Language 39, 45 (Rebecca S. Wheeler ed., 1999)
(“[African American Vernacular English] as a dialect of English still deserves respect and ac-
ceptance. It has a degree of regularity and stability attributable to a set of rules of grammar
and pronunciation, as with any language. It differs strikingly from Standard English, but there
is no more reason for calling it bad Standard English than there is for dismissing Minnesota
English as bad Virginia Speech, or the reverse.”).
229. Demesme, 228 So. 3d at 1206.
230. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. See Id. at 2496 (majority opinion).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012).
234. A state that refused to set up their own exchange. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485.
235. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a)–(c) (2012); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
236. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (“Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health
insurance markets, not to destroy them.”).
237. “[S]everal provisions that assume tax credits will be available on both State and Fed-
eral Exchanges.” Id. at 2491.
238. See id. at 2492–93 (noting that the statute contained numerous “examples of inartful
drafting”).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2495–96.
241. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking the Su-
preme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 121, 207 (2016).
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ambiguous and the ad hominem canon to resist their appeal to statutory
purpose. For the cocktail party canon, Justice Scalia believed that the only
plain meaning was the tax credits did not apply to federally established ex-
changes.242 He stated that the meaning of the provision was “so obvious
there would hardly be a need for the Supreme Court to hear a case about
it.”243 And, “[w]ords no longer have meaning if an Exchange that is not es-
tablished by a State is ‘established by the State.’ ”244 He further stated,
“[u]nder all the usual rules of interpretation, in short, the Government
should lose this case.”245 What Justice Scalia meant by this sentence, of
course, was under all of his rules of interpretation the government should
lose this case. By deploying the cocktail party canon, Justice Scalia stated that
his approach provides the one, true plain meaning—and any other ap-
proach provides a fatally flawed and illegitimate interpretation.
As for the ad hominem canon deployment, Justice Scalia was also will-
fully blind to the significant ramifications of his interpretation. He started
off by saying that “[s]tatutory design and purpose matter only to the extent
they help clarify an otherwise ambiguous provision” to let the world know
this entire exercise was illegitimate.246 After getting that out of the way, Jus-
tice Scalia then briefly attempted to discount his statute-killing interpreta-
tion: “[i]f true, these projections would show only that the statutory scheme
contains a flaw.”247 But this was no ordinary flaw; it was a fatal one. Thirty-
four states did not set up their own exchanges and required the federal
fallback.248 Gutting the federal subsidies for these thirty-four states would
have doomed the ACA.249 Justice Scalia, in response to this concern by the
majority, responded by saying that the disastrous economic and public
health results of his opinion would spur previously recalcitrant states to set
up an exchange.250 And “[t]hat reality destroys the Court’s pretense that ap-
plying the law as written would imperil ‘the viability of the entire Affordable
242. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2497.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2502.
247. Id. at 2503.
248. Robert Barnes, Affordable Care Act Survives Supreme Court Challenge, Wash. Post
(June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/obamacare-survives-su-
preme-court-challenge/2015/06/25/af87608e-188a-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html?utm_
term=.9bb02635f9ab&noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/F74W-A4V7].
249. Adrianna McIntyre & Sarah Kliff, King v. Burwell Could Have Gutted Obamacare in
34 States, Vox (June 25, 2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.vox.com/cards/obamacare-subsidies-law-
suit/what-is-the-case [https://perma.cc/8G3L-VWMD].
250. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Care Act.’ ”251 But Justice Scalia does not provide any evidence for his sug-
gestion that states that had resisted setting up an exchange with free federal
money in the past would change their minds.252
Justice Scalia deployed both the ad hominem and the cocktail party ca-
non in an attempt to destroy a massive piece of legislation that provided
healthcare to millions over a typo.253 He ignored the reality that the cutoff of
federal tax subsidies would cause a corresponding drop of healthy people in
the insurance pool, causing a “death spiral” and the collapse of the mar-
ket.254 This is New Textualism at its worst—formalistic, literalistic, and di-
vorced from context.
Conclusion
The repercussions for the rhetoric of New Textualists are varied. For
one, the use of legislative history by the Supreme Court has dropped precip-
itously since the 1980s.255 In response to this loss of information, the Court
has contemporaneously increased its use of semantic canons.256 But this rise
of canon usage and New Textualist philosophies has not brought along any
added stability or predictability.257 The sheer number of the canons of inter-
pretation available for judges creates significant judicial flexibility and un-
dermines the core tenets of New Textualism.
Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to the rhetorical problem ex-
posed by the framework in Part II. New Textualists, led by the late Justice
Antonin Scalia, waged a long and bitter war against nontextual sources of
information.258 As of today, their fierce rhetoric appears to have carried the
day.259
To fight this, courts and commentators should resist the use of the rhe-
torical canons by New Textualists. This does not mean ignoring the semantic
and substantive canons. Rather, this involves pointing out that the use of the
251. Id. (quoting id. at 2495 (majority opinion)).
252. Jon Healey, Will States Create Health Insurance Exchanges After King v. Burwell?, L.A.
Times (June 25, 2015, 4:47 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-will-states-
create-health-insurance-exchanges-after-king-vs-burwell-20150625-story.html [https://perma
.cc/52F6-9XSH] (“Republican-dominated governments didn’t want to do anything that might
sustain Obamacare.”).
253. Michael Scherer, Supreme Court Rules that a Typo Should Not Undo Obamacare, Time
(June 25, 2015), http://time.com/3935707/supreme-court-obamacare-affordable-care/ [https://
perma.cc/SNC6-EE3F].
254. See McIntyre & Kliff, supra note 249.
255. See Mendelson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 3) (citing Nicholas R. Parrillo, Levia-
than and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legisla-
tive History, 1890-1950, 123 Yale L.J. 266, 270 (2013) (noting that the number of opinions
citing legislative history has dropped by more than half)).
256. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
257. See Mendelson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 6).
258. See supra Part II (this Comment details some of Justice Scalia’s numerous opinions
where he attacks even the slightest deviation from New Textualist principles).
259. See supra Part II; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
1514 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1485
rhetorical canons by New Textualists is not an effective mode of argumenta-
tion. Instead of bowing down to the blistering rhetoric of New Textualists,
intentionalists, purposivists, and other proponents of generally accepted
methods should point out the logical failings of the New Textualist method
of interpretation. Pointing out these logical deficiencies may not have an
immediate impact. But over time it may reduce the appeal of the New Textu-
alist approach and blunt the force of their rhetoric.260
There are difficulties inherent in this proposal, especially as New Textu-
alism continues to take hold within the ranks of the judiciary. It will likely
take significant time and determination for proponents of other generally
accepted methods to gain ground. It may require a solution like a codified
method of interpretation, as several states are experimenting with.261 And it
will likely require the engagement of New Textualists themselves.
All of this rhetoric causes lasting damage. New Textualists waged total
war on the opposition and scorched the earth as they ascended to power.
But American jurisprudence as a whole would be better served if the propo-
nents of New Textualism engaged with its weaknesses, rather than attacking
other methods as unprincipled and illegitimate. New Textualists should seek
to join the debate, not shout over it.
260. An example of the blunt force of New Textualist rhetoric is Justice Scalia’s words
from a footnote to Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing): “If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion for the Court
that began: ‘The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes
certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their
identity,’ I would hide my head in a bag. The Supreme Court of the United States has de-
scended from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical
aphorisms of the fortune cookie.” Id. (quoting id. at 2593 (majority opinion)).
261. See Gluck, supra note 12.
